Archive for the ‘Nota’ Category

The description of al-Hajj Umar Tal by Shaykh Nuh

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008

Shaykh Nuh’s Reliance of the Traveller has proved an indispensable reference for so many reasons. From page 1105 of his book, I have here reproduced his concise biography of Al-Hajj Umar al-Futi Tal:

(al-Hajj) ‘Umar Tal is ‘Umar ibn Sa’id ibn ‘Uthman, al-Futi al-Turi al-Kidiwi, born in Halwar, near Podor in the Gidi district of northern Senegal in 1794. A Tijani sheikh of impressive education, intellect, and remarkable organizational talents, he conducted jihad against French troops and pagan indigenous peoples in Guinea, Senegal, and Mali from 1852 to 1864. He first studied Arabic and Islamic subjects with his father, and by the time he left home to study elsewhere, had not only memorized the Koran, but also the two Sahihs of Bukhari and Muslim. He taught the Sacred Sciences in Satina for about twelve years, during which period he joined the Tijani tariqa, a new order founded only thirteen years before his birth which was then spreading through West Africa from Mauritania. He first took the way from Sheikh ‘Abd al-Karim ibn Ahmad al-Naqil, but in less than two years decided to perform the hajj, and made his way eastward across Africa to the Hijaz, where he fulfilled the pilgrimage and completed his training in the tariqa with the Moroccan sheikh Muhammad al-Ghali al-Tijani.. He stayed with the latter for three years in Medina before being authorized as an independent sheikh. After performing hajj again, he returned first to Cairo, where he authored a Koranic commentary, and then set off in 1830 for West Africa. Enroute, he stopped for a series of residences in various cities, among them Sokoto, Nigeria, where he remained six years with Muhammad Bello, the son of the Fulani mujahid ‘Uthman ibn Fodi, writing and acquiring the firsthand military and administrative expertise that he was later to use in his jihad in West Africa, the plans for which he was beginning to formulate in his mind. Returning to his homeland after twenty years, he recruited many to the Tijani tariqa, which he marshalled for the purposes of jihad. In his military campaign, which are too numerous to record in detail here, he fought occasional skirmishes with the French, but his main efforts were directed at spreading Islam eastward by fighting the pagan Bambara people of Karta and Segu, which he did with considerable success at the head of an army that at its peak numbered some thirty thousand men. His force was well disciplined and applied Islamic law, as for example at the surrender of Karta, where ‘Umar ordered the indigenous idols he brought out to be smashed at his own hands with an iron mace. His opinions paralleled those of Ahmad ibn Idris al-Fasi and Muhammad ‘Ali Sanusi on many issues, and he admired the writings of Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahhab Sha’rani. He died in Ghoro, Mali, in 1280/1864 after an escape from being besieged in Hamdallahi during an unsuccessful bid to take Masina (Muslim Brotherhoods, 68-98).

See also Wright’s (Shaykh Hassan Cisse’s disciple) article here

Islamic Movements

Friday, August 15th, 2008

Islamic movements has been an interesting topic to me for quite a few years now. I’ve attempted to read some history books on my own about modern Islamic movements for the purpose of seeking directions for my involvement with Islamic movements today. However, it is hard to go through thick and dry texts and attempt to grasp and discern the principles that underlay these Islamic movements. So the presentation from Dr Hisham Altalib is enlightening in achieving this.

Personally, my experience working in the da’wa scene amongst the Malays, there is the tendency to idolize a particular jemaah, or a particular scholar from one jemaah. With the benefit of hindsight and available studies on various Islamic movements, particularly the movements of the twentieth century, this helps me to see claims made by these people in a new light. I can always refer to these principles and from there, point out the contexts in which those ideas emerge. This helps me to map out the viewpoints of scholars and their jemaah in their own context and, if still relevent, re-examine how that applies to the situation today. It also builds tolerance for differing opinions as I can understand where their point of view and the value of truth it has.

In summary, we begin to tackle this topic by looking at the objective of mankind which is to know each other (al-Hujurat: 13) and work towards peace and unity. Originally, Islamic movements emerged in the Umayyad when there was a rift between rulers and scholars because the leadership’s hereditary nature breeds incompetence and nepotism. One can easily be obsessed or dislike a particular movement just by reading or hearing a sympathetic/antagonistic story about them. Taqleed and dislike are two extreme attitudes in viewing an Islamic movement; we should develop a methodology to examine historical accounts of Islamic movements in an objective manner and come up with solutions to forming better Islamic movements to serve present circumstances.

One important idea in this regard is environmental context and the founder’s personality that shape its response. For example, a movement’s ideologue normally harps on liberation theology and prescribe militant resistance in a situation of colonization. Its success in anti-colonial resistance may not necessarily imply success in post-colonization if its method is imitated. To follow this mentality today may lead to one’s overlooking the intricacies of culture and its role in building civilizations. Afterall, it is easy to break but hard to build.

As a side note however, it is also crucial to not merely leave ideas behind in its context and then dismiss it on the justification that it is obsolete. Each movement has its own focus, we look at all of them and benefit from it all. Quoting Dr Mahmoud Ayoub, “I am a traditionalist. I believe it is easier to build upon what is already available rather than to start anew.”

In the context of America, for example, similar perhaps to medieval Baghdad, the materialistic society brought about a sufi-oriented movement like the Qadiriyyah of Abdul Qadir Jilani. Similarly, sufi poetry from the likes of Rumi and Hafez are well-received in materialistic America today among the afluent. One can look at it in two ways. Firstly, prescriptively speaking, for every challenge there must be an appropriate response. Secondly, and descriptively speaking, actions bring about reactions. Communism may not necessarily have been the best response, it was simply a “mechanical” reaction elicited by poverty.

There are various lessons to learn from past Islamic movements. Blind immitation will not lead to succes, be it immitation of the West or immitation of Islam’s glorious past. We should follow a faqih’s hujjah, not the faqih himself. It is unfortunate that innovation is looked down upon as bid’ah dalalah, where in fact progress can only come through positive innovative thinking (bid’ah hasanah).

In recent times, because popular Islamic groups today emerged in the context of anti-colonialism, there is the denial of agency mentality. Issues concerning the ummah today are conveniently reduced to blaming on outsiders. Whether it is true or not, it does not help to be in this constant denial of agency. Malik Bennabi says, when one is sick, the whole body is sick. It cannot think properly, somebody else has to think for it. If not, it leads to a symptomatic appraoch rather than cause-effect.

What built the great Islamic civilization of the past is the waqf system. it wasn’t the state. Colonialism sabotaged the waqf and put it under the government’s control, leading to corruption. Another factor is the madrasah system, which likewise, was overtaken by secular schools. Islam is then no longer taught. Islamic movements attempted to fill this gap but it was too little too late, lacking in its modern technology and resources. So this becomes an issue.

Bear in mind, a movement in the opposition is isolated from participation. Their actions become empty theoretical slogans that lack experience, no viable alternatives, unable to solve peoples problems, and end up becoming marginalized. In essence, the notion that Islam is good for all times implies tajdeed (renewal), islah (reform), tahdeeth (modernization), morouna (flexibility), ibda’ (creativity). Before I finish, as a final thought, what other principles can we pick up from the general academic studies done on non-Islamic social movements? Perhaps there are lessons to be learned here too?

Is There a Case for the Muslim Brotherhood?

Friday, August 15th, 2008

In da’wah cricles that I have been involved in, the Ikhwanul Muslimin has often been regarded as the standard by which all else is measured against. In MISG’s history, for example, I am troubled by periphery figures that rush in and usurp the central leadership, and sadly wipe out this organization’s precedent history and legacy with such vehemence on the claim that they “are the real Ikhwan” , possess “direct training from the them” and therefore have the right to determine the proper course of action, in other words, lead the organization. Some questions that can be raised here include, 1) what’s the significance of the Ikhwan?, 2) why is it regarded as the benchmark such that the more training you receive through it, the more right you have to lead?, 3) how do you measure who is more Ikhwan than others?, 4) what do you mean by message of the Ikhwan? Is it the worldview of Al-Banna? Or Hudaybi? Tilmisani? Qutb? Qaradawi?

Before going into the case of Muslim Brotherhood, we examine the intellectual background that set the tone for its emergence. In the discussion of the article The Heritage of the Islamic Reform Movement: A Seminar Draft Proposal”, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) is portrayed as the father of modern Islamic reform movement. His message was a reform-oriented philosophical salafiyah mode of thought. This set the tone for what was to come in the form of the Ikhwan in Egypt. What was skipped, though, was a paragraph on earlier ideologues that gave rise to movements not in reaction to the West but modernizing reforms on its own terms and social conditions. Historian John Voll claims the literalist salafiyah of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and the traditionalist reform of Shah Waliyullah al-Dihlawi as original reformers that prove there is a continued internal vitality of the local Muslims for modernizing reforms despite lack of contact with Europe and the fact that they also influenced later day reformists.

On a different note, these figures only produced ideas but not organized large scale movements. It was Hassan al-Banna who founded the earliest organized modern Islamic reform movement. I argue on the contrary that there are movements that came about before the Ikhwan like the Islah of Algeria and the Muhammadiyah of Indonesia. Which leads me to the question of what’s so significant about the Ikhwan? Dr Mahmoud Abu Saud writes in 1977 of a three-point perspective that, in my opinion, attemps to place the Ikhwan as a wise response that met the challenge of its time in Egypt and the middle east turmoil, and not simply a whimsical reaction. That article however does not take a comparative approach and one wonders if the Algerian Islah and Indonesian Muhammadiyah were any different in responding to their respective problems. Perhaps the charisma of al-Banna was not there, but other than that, did the Ikhwan succeed simply because of its geographical placement around al-Azhar and its role in the Palestinian conflict? If that’s the case, it would have demonstrated its ability to deal with the Middle East, but does it have the right to venture outside of that territory and usurp other indigenous movements around the Muslim world?

It is claimed that the strength of the Ikhwanul Muslimin is its principles of moderation, practicality, universality and an ardent insistence on tarbiyyah as a means to recruit and build a strong following. Although this concept of tarbiyyah can be seen in the positive light of providing education and Islamic consciousness but it can also be seen negatively as a form of indoctrination to stamp conservative fundamentalist attitude and dogma bordering on fanaticism towards the Ikhwan, which becomes problematic among non-Arabs. In fact, in one of the risala of al-Banna, he himself in answering to questions of his emphasis on his nationhood is against the idea of exporting a rubber stamp version of the Ikhwan to other countries. In addition to that, interestingly enough, movements that succeeded outside of Egypt were the ones that managed to come out of “ikhwan” dogma and realize its own vision. One cites the example of al-Turabi’s movement in Sudan to prove this point. So is there really a case for the Muslim Brotherhood outside of the Middle East?

Dialog 2

Sunday, August 3rd, 2008

Knock knock…

Salam alaikum Dr Shafiq!

We’re going for a walk. Want to join?

Oh sure! I’ll be ready in a minute. Wait for me downstairs.

[Yes... time to hobnob! :) ]

[... brisk walking around Herndon ...]

So you did your PhD at Temple with al-Faruqi? Are you also familiar with Al-Attas?

Yes. I was together with al-Attas. We couldn’t get along too well. I’ll go to bed latest at 11pm and wake up early. He used to stay up all night and sleep after Fajr. I wonder, is he still alive? Must be very old now..

Yes he’s still around Malaysia though a bit subdued of late.

Tell me more about this Islamization of Knowledge and its interlocutors. Like the Attas-Faruqi discussions. I’ve read Islam & Secularism and his paper on Islamic philosophy of education presented in Jeddah. The concept of ta’dib and all that. And Faruqi’s Ummatic and Tauhidic approach.

Well al-Attas’s approach is a sufi way. I’ve read his writings. It does make sense. To understand his idea of ta’dib, it is based on the Prolegomena book.

However Faruqi’s idea was eventually adopted. The International Islamic universities around the world like the one in Malaysia is based on Faruqi’s rather than the other.

So IIIT and these Islamic universities is all about Islamization of knowledge. What’s your take?

The idea is losing out. They have some problems with it now. Western secular universities have the momentum and it’s very hard to go against it. There are also some internal problems and political conflicts.

So this emphasis on “Maqasidism” is an idea that IIIT is reviving as its main thrust in place of the Islamization project?

IIIT is still trying to push for Islamization. Perhaps at a smaller scale. They started talking about Maqasid in a major way beginning in the 90s. It’s always been there, just the emphasis wasn’t. There’s some issues with this too.

[interlocutor shifted to another person. will ensue in a separate post]

Dialog 1

Sunday, August 3rd, 2008

Feeling a bit down and frustrated, I was desperate for some hobnobbing. So I grabbed the phone.

Could you please hook me to room 114?

Kring.. kring..

Hello?

Yes, Pak Ayoub, this is me [kaki bangku]. Assalamualaikum. Do you need any help?

Yes I do actually, my … supermarket … groceries … take me …. (*abriged for privacy reasons)

[Hurah! Just what I need to get over some personal frustrations!]

[...so we're outside in the calm summer night...]

So Pak Ayoub what do you think of the book Cultural Atlas of Islam?

It’s a very useful book. There’s a lot of information in it. But it needs to be updated. These reference-type books get outdated quickly.

Honestly I don’t like it. The information is not presented very well. I especially don’t like his chapter on Tasawwuf. In it he basically lumped together everything that was folk practice and backward with Sufism. I have major disagreement with this as I think Sufism is a science that has its principles and rules. He mistook sufism for syncretism. And how can sufism be backwards when it was the agent of 18th century social movements. How can he scapegoat sufism as the reason for the Ummah’s downfall after the Abbasid?

Yes he doesn’t like Sufism. It’s very unfortunate. In the contemporary Muslim world the tragedy of most Muslim intellectuals is that they are nationalists. Faruqi was caught up in his notion of Urubiya. [me: didn't he drop that for Ummatism?] In the 18th and 19th century Sufis played a crucial role. Arabic language and culture was preserved despite the colonial onslaught during this time primarily through the work of the sufis. The ummah did not go through a total decline, there were some flourishing of arts and architecture in the 18th and 19th century. And the decline is mainly due to the disintegration of the ummah into the Ottomans, Moghul and Safavid whereas before there was a unified Caliphate. The philosophical Sufis have also been at the forefront of intellectualism in Islam.

[... and there we were at Bloom.... ]

Sayang! You’re here. Thank you for bringing him over, [Kaki bangku].

No problem. It was my pleasure.

I will talk with you some more.

OK, bye!

Al-Jabbar

Wednesday, June 18th, 2008

al-jabbar

He is the superb Comforter for the oppressed and the Superb Potentate for the oppressors

Source: http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles1608.html

Kena kunyah dulu!

Wednesday, June 18th, 2008

Pengajaran dari seorang pujangga di Atlanta: Bila kelaparan, kita biasanya makan gelojoh. Apatah lagi kalau makanannya sedap. Tapi kena awas kerana makanan yang ditelan tanpa kunyah manfaatnya tak banyak. Makanan perlu dikunyah satu persatu baru boleh khadam betul.

Zikir tujuh lapis

Wednesday, June 4th, 2008

Jika burrito tujuh lapis (7 layer burrito) dari Taco Bell adalah penyelesaian kepada masalah kesempitan wang dan kemalasan memasak, zikir tujuh lapis (musabi’atul ashara) pula adalah penyelesaian kepada kesempitan hati dan himpunan dosa. Cubalah rasakannya 2 kali sehari, pagi dan petang. Sungguh mengenyangkan!

Brilliant

Monday, May 5th, 2008

Setelah membaca usulan saya, beliau mengucapkan perkataan “brilliant” dan diulang-ulangkanny ntah berapa banyak kali. Dan setiap kali itu saya sambut dengan segala pujian itu untuk Allah…

Islam and Modernity: 3 historical models of Islamic civilization

Tuesday, January 15th, 2008

Dominant understanding before 80s is that Islam is on the way out for modern times
- as is also the case with other biblical religions that dont fit with mdoern science.

So John Voll is on e of those who made strong case that sciecne will actually NOT finish off religion because:
- that is based on a narrow understanding of religion (only in its metaphysical sense)
– it is not all about beliefs
– Voll says religion is an intellectual framework that has cultural and social effects
– it shapes society
– has a fundamental relation with history – no society hasn’t religion as a fundamental source of organiztion
– so even if cognitively thrown off balance, religion’s cultural phenomenon keeps it in significance.

2 examples to illustrate this point in mid 20th century:
- civil rights movement
- gender revolution
–> religious leaders using religious slogans were the catalysts in this (ex: Reverend Martin Luther King)

Decolonization of much of the world:
- notably india
- led by Mahatma Gandhi employing hindu doctrine of non-violence
– sacrality of all forms of life (ahimsa)
– overthrowing colonial through passive resistance rather than armed struggle

How did scholars not notice this strong force of religion in social & political change of mid twentieht cnetury?

Another main idea of Voll:
- the basic issue to understand Islam & Modernity is the impact of WEstern power over Muslim societies
– powerful impact too much to be resisted
– not much options but to fall in line with overwhelming european power

What is the nuanced take of West upoin different Muslim societies

ISLAMDOM

Hodgson has idea of Islam having connection with civilization
- not neccessarily Islamic people
- refers to grand narrrative of Islam as multi cultural and plural Islamic societies.
– 30% Christians in Syria, 50% Crhistians in lebanon, 10% in egypt
– all are heartland of Islam
– all participate actively in the Islamicate
– the spirit is deeply Islamic though not fully Islam

Tradition->culture->Civilization

Islamic Civilization – 2 – Semitic (Jew, Arab, Christian) & Iranian -> Late sasani & Primitive Caliphal period – the dynasty that ruled Iran in late 5th century

The Fertile Crescent
- decline of Iranian sasanid empire
- central event was rise of power of Muhammad’
- arises the high caliphal period
– classical civilization under Marwani & Abbasids
– a single vast state – only one political entity (“Caliphate”)
– one dominant language of religion, science & culture – that is Arabic
– Linguistic rather than ethnic because they are from places like Iran Kurd Berber etc

Iman -> theology (rational) -> from scripture -> a narrative (imaginative & emotional)

so original/classical form was narrative

Islam -> Law
Ihsan -> Mysticism

Lawyering
-maneuvring
-bending laws w/o breaking it
-mechanical compliance with rules w/o fulfilling the spirit of the law.

Thus emerges mysticism

In discourses, debate whether to change the original (not as elaborate) or the classical udnerstanding (things added on)

Roman & judeo christian -> compositve of western civilization

disintegration of central islamic caliphate
- fragment into multiple political entities
- usher in period of Early Middle Islamic Period
-decentralization of power & culture
- two langues – persian & arabic
-united through force of self-perpetuating institutions – the Mosque and &Zawiya

mosque -> courts, schools, styles of leadership
zawiya -> sufi orders, styles of leadership

ibn battutah – spaniard who travelled all the way to China
– as a lawyer – able to maintain upkeep by being a qadi in various places

Religious orders following the spiritual discipline of an accomplished centered in a zawiya

law – scholarly
sufi -> saintly

they are continuous across poliitcal spheres and dynasties

stagerring differences yet have this continuity

this ended in crisis of Mongol invasion (1258)

Crisis & renewal: despite devastation & conquests
– global spread of Islam continued cuturally – started new political traditions

Flowering of persianate cuture across Asia whilst Africa maintained Arabic

Hodgson adopts spiral model of continuous growth rather than linear rise and fall

Gunpowder Empires
- second flowering of Islamic civilization
- until 1789 (conquest of Egypt by Napoleon)
- third model

1st – centralized
2nd – decentralized
3rd – regional empires – Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal

Relative importance of arms and ideas – which is better? ideas are more everlasting (intellectual capital)
Modern technological issues…